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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Daniel Deltoro-Cuevas timely appeals from the district court's order revoking
probation. On appeal, Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied
him due process and equal protection when it refused to augment the appellate record
with various transcripts. Additionally, Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas argues that the district court
abused its discretion when it failed to further reduce his sentence sua sponte upon
revoking probation.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas was charged, by Information, with eluding, two counts of
injury to a child, an excessive DUI, and failure to purchase a driver's license.
(R., pp.37-39.)

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas pleaded guilty to

felony injury to a child and misdemeanor excessive, DUI and in return, the State
dismissed the remaining charges. (R., pp.43-44, 66-68.) Thereafter, the district court
imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, for felony injury to a
child and a concurrent sentence of 180 days for excessive DUI. (R., pp.73-76.) The
district court retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.73-76.) Upon review of Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas'
period of retained jurisdiction (hereinafter, rider), the district court suspended the
sentence and placed Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas on probation. (R., pp.85-86.)
After a period of probation, the State filed a report of probation violation alleging
that Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas violated the terms of his probation.

(R., pp.92-93.)

Mr. Deltoro-Admitted that he violated the terms of his probation by returning to the
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United States and failing to report to his probation officer. 1 (11/27/12 Tr., p.5, L.24 - p.6,
L.10.) The district court revoked Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas' probation and executed a reduced
unified sentence of ten years, with one year fixed. (R., pp.105-107.) Mr. Deltoro timely
appealed. (R., pp.109-111.)
On appeal, Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas filed a motion to augment the record with various
transcripts.

(Motion to Augment, pp.1-4.) The State objected in part to Mr. Deltoro-

Cuevas' request for the transcripts. (Objection in part to "Motion to Augment and to
Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof" (hereinafter,
Objection to Motion to Augment), pp.1-4.) Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme Court entered
an order greanting Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas' request for the Admit/deny hearing held on
November 27, 2012, but denied Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas' request for transcripts of the
change of plea hearing held on October 20, 2009, the sentencing hearing held on
January 12, 2010, and the rider review hearing held on June 18, 2010. (Order, Denying
Motion to Augment and Suspend the Briefing Schedule Without Prejudice (hereinafter,
Order Denying Motion to Augment), pp.1-2.)

1

This explanation of the probation violation is inconsistent with the statements made at
the probation violation disposition hearing, where Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas' trial counsel
indicated that he absconded to California. (12/31/12 Tr., p.5, Ls.3-25.) Additionally,
Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas would not have been deported because he is a legal resident of the
United States and the underlying offense was not a deportable offense. (PSI, p.3.)
2

ISSUES
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas due process and equal
protection when it denied his Motion to Augment with transcripts necessary for
review of the issues on appeal?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to further reduce
Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas' sentence sua sponte upon revoking probation?

3

ARGUMENT
I.
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas Due Process And Equal
Protection When It Denied His Motion To Augment With Transcripts Necessary For
Review Of The Issues On Appeal
A.

Introduction
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it is a violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses to deny an indigent
defendant access to transcripts of proceedings which are relevant to issues the
defendant intends to raise on appeal. In the event the record reflects a colorable need
for a transcript, the only way a court can constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant
from obtaining that transcript is if the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to
the issues on appeal or if a sufficient substitute for the transcript exists.
In this case, the Idaho Supreme Court denied Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas' request for
transcripts of the change of plea hearing held on October 20, 2009, the sentencing
hearing held on January 12, 2010, and the rider review hearing held on June 18, 2010.
(Order Denying Motion to Augment), pp.1-2.)

On appeal, Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas is

challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his request for transcripts of the
change of plea hearing held on October 20, 2009, the sentencing hearing held on
January 12, 2010, and the rider review hearing held on June 18, 2010. Mr. DeltoroCuevas asserts that the requested transcripts are relevant to the issue of whether the
district court abused its discretion when it failed to further reduce his sentence sua
sponte upon revoking probation because the applicable standard of review requires an

appellate court to conduct an independent review of the entirety of the proceedings in

4

order to evaluate the district court's sentencing decisions.

Therefore, the Idaho

Supreme Court erred in denying his request.

B.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas With
Access To The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process And Equal
Protection Because He Cannot Obtain A Merits Based Appellate Review Of His
Sentencing Claims
The constitutions of both the United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a

criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; IDAHO CONST. art.
I§ 13.

It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965);
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair."
Lassiterv. Department of Soc. Sec. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981).
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood,

132 Idaho 88 (1998)).

The Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United States

Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United States
Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State, Dept. of
Health and Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221,227 (1998).

In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is statutory. See I.C. § 19-2801.
Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a relevant transcript, the
transcript must be created at county expense. I.C. § 1-1105(2); I.C. § 19-863(a). Idaho
court rules also address this issue. Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2 mandates the production of
transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant.

I.C.R. 5.2(a).

Further,

"[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding before the court .... " Id.
Idaho Criminal Rule 54. 7 further enables a district court to "order a transcript to be
5

prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from paying such a fee as
provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.?(a).
An appeal from an order revoking probation is an appeal of right as defined in
Idaho Appellate Rule 11. An order revoking probation is an order "made after judgment
affecting substantial rights of the defendant."

State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852

(Ct. App. 1983). Additionally, an appeal from the denial of an Idaho Criminal Rule 35(b)
motion is an appeal as of right as defined by Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (c)(9).

See

State v. Fuller, 104 Idaho 891 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding an order denying a motion for
reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is an appealable order pursuant to then I.AR.
11(c)(6)).
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of opinions directly
addressing whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the
relevant proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these cases.
The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection
clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent defendants
and those with financial means is not tolerated. However, the second theme limits the
states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for review. The states do
not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they request. In order to meet
the constitutional mandates of due process and equal protection, the states must
provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless some or all of the
requested material are unnecessary or frivolous.
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a
6

certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript of the
proceedings, be furnished [to] them without cost." Griffin, 351 U.S. at 13. At that time,
the State of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been
sentenced to death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase
transcripts themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme
Court was whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty
defendants was a denial of due process and equal protection. Id. at 16.
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich,
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on equal footing before the bar of
justice in every American court."' Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty
than on the account of religion, race, or color." Id. The Supreme Court went on to hold
as follows:
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny
the poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious
discriminations.
Id. at 18 (citations omitted). In order to satisfy the constitutional mandates of both due

process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be provided with a record
7

which facilitates an effective, merits-related appellate review.

At the same time, the

Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary in instances where
a less expensive, yet accurate, alternative exists. Id. at 20.
In Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Court reaffirmed its holding in Griffin
when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court be
accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of the defendant's indigency. The
United States Supreme Court held that "once the State chooses to establish appellate
review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access to any phase of that
procedure because of their poverty." Id. at 257. "This principle is no less applicable
where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase of its
appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of that
procedure solely because of his indigency." Id.
In Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a
procedure determining whether access to transcripts based on a frivolousness
standard. "Under the present standard, .... they must convince the trial judge that
their contentions of error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary
to prosecute their appeal." Draper, 327 U.S. at 494. The Court first expanded upon its
holding in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent
alternative is available, by adding a relevancy requirement stating that "part or all of the
stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend funds unnecessarily in such
circumstances." Id. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised on
appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts. The
Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendants could not be
8

adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial
proceedings. Id. at 497-99.
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), extended the Griffin protections

to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on
appeal. In doing so, it held "where the grounds of appeal ... make out a colorable need
for a complete transcript, the burden is on the State to show that only a portion of the
transcript or an 'alternative' will suffice for an effective appeal on those grounds. Id at
195.
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the
Idaho Court of Appeals.

See Gardner v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v.

Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App.

2007).
If the record establishes that the requested transcripts are relevant to the issues
on appeal, due process and equal protection mandate that those transcripts be created
at the public's expense, unless the State can prove that the requested transcripts are
not relevant to the issues on appeal.

C.

The Requested Transcripts Are Relevant To Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas' Appeal
Because He Is Challenging The Length Of His Sentence And The Applicable
Standard Of Review Requires An Appellate Court To Independently Review The
Entire Record Before The District Court
The requested transcripts are necessary for review of the issue raised in this

appeal because they are within an Idaho appellate court's scope of review. "When we
review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will
examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment
9

We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as
events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation."
State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28 (Ct. App. 2009) (emphasis added).

In other

words, an appellate court reviewing a district court's sentencing decision conducts an
independent review of the entire record to determine if the record supports the district
court's sentencing decisions.

This scope of review is necessary in Idaho because

judges are not required to state their sentencing rationale on the record. State v. Nield,
106 Idaho 665, 666 (1984).
In this case, Judge Crabtree presided over the final disposition hearing held on
December 31, 2012.

(R., p.104.) Judge Crabtree also presided over the change of

plea hearing held on October 20, 2009, the sentencing hearing held on January 12,
2010, and the rider review hearing held on June 18, 2010. (R., pp.43-44, 71-72, 84.)
The following authority establishes that the transcripts of those hearings will be
necessary for an appellate court to review the merits of Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas appellate
sentencing claims.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has recently issued an opinion in State v. Morgan,
153 Idaho 618 (Ct. App. 2012), which addressed the scope of review of an appeal filed
from an order revoking probation. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty and was
placed on probation. Id. at 619. After a period of probation, the defendant admitted to
violating the terms of his probation and the district court revoked probation, but retained
jurisdiction. Id. at 619-620. The defendant subsequently admitted to violating the terms
of his probation and the district court revoked probation. Id. The defendant appealed
from the district court's second order revoking probation. Id.

10

On appeal, the defendant filed a motion to augment the appellate record with
transcripts associated with his first probation violation and disposition, which was denied
by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. The defendant then raised as issues on appeal the
question of whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal
protection when it denied the motion to augment and whether the district court abused
its discretion when it revoked probation. Id. at 620-21. The Idaho Court of Appeals held
that the transcripts of the prior probation proceedings were not necessary for the appeal
because "they were not before the district court in the second probation violation
proceedings, and the district court gave no indication that it based its revocation
decision upon anything that occurred during those proceedings." Id. at 621. The Court
of Appeals then clarified the scope of review for a revocation determination.
Specifically, it held:
[l]n reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily
confine ourselves to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the
time of the revocation of probation. However, that does not mean that all
proceedings in the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane.
The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision
to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues
which are properly made part of the record on appeal.
Id. (original emphasis) (citation omitted).

The instant case is distinguishable because Morgan only addressed the order
revoking probation, and here Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas is challenging the length of his
sentence, which entails an analysis of "the entire record encompassing events before
and after the original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the
sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and

11

the revocation of probation."2 Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28. Furthermore, whether the
transcripts of the requested proceedings were before the district court at the time of the
probation revocation hearing is not germane to the question of whether the transcripts
are relevant to the issues on appeal because, in reaching a sentencing decision, a
district court is not limited to considering only that information offered at the hearing
from which the appeal was filed.

Rather, the court is entitled to utilize knowledge

gained from its own official position and observations. See Downing v. State, 136 Idaho
367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983)
(recognizing that the findings of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon

In Morgan, the Court of Appeals refused to address Mr. Morgan's claim that the Idaho
Supreme Court denied him due process on the basis that it does not have the power to
overrule a decision by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. at 621. The Morgan Court went on
to state that it would have the authority to review a renewed motion to augment if it was
filed with the Court of Appeals after the appeal was assigned to the Court of Appeals
and contained information or argument which was not presented to the Idaho Supreme
Court. Id. However, this position is untenable because Idaho Appellate Rule 30
requires that all motions to augment be filed with the Supreme Court. The relevant
portions of I.AR. 30 follow:
2

Any party may move the Supreme Court to augment or delete from the
settled reporter's transcript or clerk's or agency's record.

Unless otherwise expressly ordered by the Supreme Court such motion
shall be determined without oral argument. The reporter's transcript and
clerk's or agency's record may also be augmented or portions deleted by
stipulation of the parties and order of the Supreme Court.
(emphasis added). Therefore, the Morgan Court's statement that Mr. Morgan could
have filed a renewed motion to augment directly with the Court of Appeals is contrary to
the Idaho Appellate Rules. Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas recognizes that the Idaho Court of
Appeals has recently rejected virtually identical arguments in State v. Cornelison, 2013
Published Opinion 22 (Ct. App. April 11, 2013). However, Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas
disagrees with the holding in that case.

12

what the court heard during trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977) (recognizing
that the court could rely upon "the number of certain types of criminal transactions that
[the judge] has observed in the courts within its judicial district and the quantity of drugs
therein involved"); State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984) (approving
sentencing court's reliance upon evidence presented at the preliminary hearing from a
previously dismissed case because "the judge hardly could be expected to disregard
what he already knew about Gibson from the other case").

Thus, whether the prior

hearings were transcribed or not is irrelevant, because the court may rely upon the
information it already knows from presiding over the prior hearings when it made the
sentencing decision after revoking probation.
The rationale behind this position comports with the Idaho Court of Appeals'
reasoning in State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053 (Ct. App. 1989), where the Court of
Appeals explained why the appellate courts should look to the entire record when
reviewing the executed sentence:
[W]hen we review a sentence ordered into execution after probation has
been revoked, we examine the entire record encompassing events before
and after the original judgment. We adopt this scope of review for two
reasons. First, the district judge, when deciding whether to order execution
of the original sentence or of a reduced sentence, does not artificially
segregate the facts into prejudgment and postjudgment categories. The
judge naturally and quite properly remembers the entire course of events
and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision. When reviewing
that decision, we should consider the same facts. Second, when a
sentence is suspended and probation is granted, the defendant has scant
reason, and no incentive, to appeal. Only if the probation is later revoked,
and the sentence is ordered into execution, does the issue of an
excessive sentence become genuinely meaningful. Were we to adopt the
state's position that any claim of excessiveness is waived if not made on
immediate appeal from the judgment pronouncing but suspending a
sentence, defendants would be forced to file preventive appeals as a
hedge against the risk that probation someday might be revoked. We see
no reason to compel this hollow exercise. Neither do we wish to see the
appellate system cluttered with such cases.
13

Adams, 115 Idaho at 1055-56.

As such, when an appellant files an appeal from a sentence ordered after the
revocation of probation the applicable standard of review requires an independent and
comprehensive inquiry into the events which occurred prior to, as well as the events
which occurred during, the probation revocation proceedings.

The basis for this

standard of review is that the district court "naturally and quite properly remembers the
entire course of events and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision." Id. It
follows that, "[w]hen reviewing that decision, [an appellate court] should consider the
same facts." Id. The Court of Appeals did not hold that the district court must expressly
reference prior proceedings at the probation disposition hearing in order for this
standard of review to become applicable.
presumed the judge would

automatically

To the contrary, the Court of Appeals
consider prejudgment events

when

determining what sentence should be executed after revoking probation. Whether the
prior hearings were transcribed or not, is irrelevant, as an appellate court will presume
that the district court will remember and consider the events from the prior proceedings
when it executes a sentence after revoking probation.
Since the requested transcripts are within the applicable standard of review, the
Idaho Supreme Court's decision to deny Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas access to those transcripts
constitutes a due process and equal protection violation. In Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S.
477 (1963), a transcript was necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be
dismissed without the transcript.

Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81.

Similarly, in Idaho, an

appellant must provide an adequate record or face procedural default.

"It is well

established that an appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon
which the appellate court can review the merits of the claims of error, .... and where
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pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the
actions of the trial court." State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999); see also
State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991 ); State v. Murinko, 108 Idaho 872,
873 (Ct. App. 1985).

If the transcripts are missing, but the record contains court

minutes are sufficient to allow a meaningful review of an appellant's claim, then the
transcripts are not necessary for review even though the Court of Appeals has "strongly
suggest[ed] that appellate counsel not rely on the district court minutes to provide ... [a]
record for [that] Court's review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999).
If Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas fails to provide the appellate court with transcripts necessary for
review of his claim, the legal presumption will apply and Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas' sentencing
claims will not be addressed on their actual merits. If it is state action, combined with
Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas' indigency, which prevents him from access to the necessary
transcripts, then such action is a violation of the equal protection and due process
clauses and any such presumption should no longer apply.
Moreover, and in light of the denial of the transcripts, the foregoing presumption
should be reversed in this case, and what occurred at those hearings should be
presumed to discredit the district court's final sentencing decision. When Mr. DeltoroCuevas was first given the opportunity for probation, the district court must have found
that the circumstances were right to give him an opportunity to be a member of society.
To ignore the positive factors that were present at the previous hearings presents a
negative, one-sided view of Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas.

Denial of access to the requested

transcripts has prevented Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas from addressing those positive factors in
support of his appellate sentencing claims. In light of that denial, Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas
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argues that the events which occurred at the subject hearings should be presumed to
invalidate the district court's final sentencing decisions in this matter.
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both
due process and equal protection to deny an indigent defendant transcripts necessary
for a merits-based review on appeal.

In this case, the requested transcripts are

necessary to address the issues on appeal because the applicable standard of review
of an appellate sentencing claim requires the appellate court to conduct an independent
review of all of the proceedings before the district court. Under this standard of review,
the focus is not entirely on the district court's express sentencing rationale 3 ; to the
contrary, the main question on appeal is if the record itself supports the district court's
ultimate sentencing decision.

As such, the decision to deny Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas'

request for the transcripts will render his appeal meaningless because it will be
presumed that the missing transcripts support the district court's sentencing decisions.
This functions as a procedural bar to the review of Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas' appellate
sentencing claims on the merits and, therefore, he should either be provided with the
requested transcripts or the presumption should not be applied.

Since Mr. Deltoro-

Cuevas' request for the transcripts was denied, that presumption should be reversed in
his favor.

Both the United States Supreme Court and the Idaho Supreme Court have
consistently held that due process requires trial courts to expressly articulate, on the
record, their rationale for revoking probation in order to facilitate an effective merits
based review of those decisions. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); see also
State v. Chapman, 111 Idaho 152 (1986), supra.
3
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D.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas With
Access To The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process Because
He Cannot Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court

relied on Griffin, supra, and its progeny and held that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants counsel on
appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the Court recognized a due process
right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal.

According to the United States

Supreme Court:
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to
counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant
has a right to counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it
comprehended the right to effective assistance of counsel.
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397.

The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the
United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a conscientious
examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made.
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), held that the constitutional requirements

of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he
supports his client's appeal to the best of his ability." See a/so Banuelos v. State, 127
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995).

In this case, the lack of access to the requested

transcripts prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination of the
case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether there is
an additional issue to raise, or whether there is factual support either in favor of any
argument to be made or undercutting an argument. Therefore, Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas has
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not obtained review of the court proceeding based on the merits and was not provided
with effective assistance of counsel in that endeavor.
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on

other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the Idaho Supreme Court held
that the starting point for evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance of
counsel in a criminal action is the American Bar Association's "Standards For Criminal
Justice, The Defense Function."

These standards offer insight into the role and

responsibilities of appellate counsel. Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state:
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel,
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . . . Counsel
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking substance.
Standards 4-8.3(b).

In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate

counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's
sentencing determination at issue.

Further, counsel is unable to advise Mr. Deltoro-

Cuevas on the probable role the transcripts may play in the appeal.
Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal,
and effective counsel cannot be given in the absence of access to the relevant
transcripts. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas his
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection which include a right to
effective assistance of counsel in this appeal. Accordingly, appellate counsel should be
provided with access to the requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity

18

to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues or arguments which arise
as a result of that review.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Further Reduce Mr. DeltoroCuevas' Sentences Sua Sponte Upon Revoking Probation
Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence
of ten years, with one year fixed, is excessive. Due to the district court's power under
I.C.R. 35 to reduce the length of the original sentence sua sponte upon the revocation
of probation, on appeal a defendant can challenge the length of the sentence as being
excessive. State v. Jensen, 138 Idaho 941, 944 (Ct. App. 2003). Where a defendant
contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the
appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to
the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public
interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence."'

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)).

Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas does not

allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show
an abuse of discretion, Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas must show that in light of the governing
criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts.

Id.

The

governing criteria, or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2)
deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation;
and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
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There are mitigating factors present in this matter which support the conclusion
that Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas' sentence is excessively harsh. Specifically, his family support
is a mitigating factor.

Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas has family support and speaks with his

mother regularly. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.4.) However,
Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas' mother does not support his criminal behavior and "scolded" him
for committing the underlying offense. (PSI, p.4.)
Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas has a strong employment record. Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas has a
minimal amount of formal education because his father made him quit school to help his
family care for cattle.
background.

(PSI, p.6.)

(PSI, pp.6-7.)

Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas has a strong employment

His employer at the time of the original sentencing

considered him a handworker. (PSI, p.7.) His immediate supervisor at that company
also said that Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas was a hard worker and that he "arrives earlier than
his co-workers, and completes his assigned tasks. (PSI, p.7.)
Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas' performance while on his rider is a mitigating factor.
Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas performed well while on his rider and earned a probation
recommendation from the Department of Correction.

(Addendum to the PSI

(hereinafter, APSI), pp.4-5.) The Department of Correction summarized Mr. Deltoro-

Cuevas' rider performance as follows:
Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas demonstrated a good understanding of his addiction
and continues to develop plans to deal with both personal and external
pressures that may lead to relapse. Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas' efforts in the
program appeared to be sincere regarding his willingness to change his
criminal thinking and behavior. Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas understands what is
expected of him.
(APSI, p.5.) According to the C-Notes attached to the APSI, Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas would
help the janitor "all the time" and was considered a "great inmate to have around." (CNotes attached to APSI, p.1.) On one occasion, Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas volunteered to do
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some "deep cleaning" in the kitchen and his work was characterized as "excellent." (CNotes attached to APSI, p.1.)
Finally, there are mitigating circumstances surrounding Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas' final
probation violation. Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas recognizes that that he made a poor decision
when he decided to abscond. However, when he was released on probation his wife
had left him and she was his only tie to Idaho as his family lived in California. (12/31/12
Tr., p.5, Ls.3-10.) While he was in California he did not engage in any illegal activity.
(12/31/12 Tr., p.5, L.18- p.6, L.3.)
In sum, there are mitigating factors present in this matter which support the
conclusion that Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas' sentence is excessively harsh.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas' respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts
and the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues or
arguments which arise as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied,
Mr. Deltoro-Cuevas' requests that the indeterminate portion of his sentence be reduced.
DATED this 2yth day of September, 2013.

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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